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Abstract
This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art
of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a
long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies
have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is
now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation tech-
nique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and
intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants
are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To
understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the
economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three
major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem.
(i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured
and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed
performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which
are typically the participants’ private information.
(ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the
identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic rea-
sons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory.
The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information
provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests.
(iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer’s goal
is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting
question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system
performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals.
In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic
modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides
design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive.
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